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BACKGROUND PAPER 5

IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN ISRAEL

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ABSTRACT

Israel is a country of immigrants who have multiplied its population several-fold in a few decades since 1948; it has vast and intensive experience in managing this influx and its related phenomena. Israel's immigration policy answers as well as the components of this policy agenda, accumulated in the course of fifty years of statehood, particularly in the 1990s, its absorption conceptualization,[2] its routine practices, and its approach to change resulting from mounting problems may offer sensible policy alternatives for other countries meeting the challenge of immigration. Between 1948 and 1997 more than three quarters of its population entered the country from abroad. Particularly marked within this period was an increase of twenty percent from 1989 to 1996, following the great wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union (FSU). Israel's current absorption problems are simply a stark example of what is increasingly to be faced, for instance, by North American, South East Asian, and European countries, as cross-border migration becomes easier or a matter of survival.

This paper will present the Israeli case and touch on some of the key issues on the research agenda of most immigrant-absorbing countries[3] whether in Germany, the United States, and Canada, or in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.[4] Although different countries may vary in size and immigration policies, the problems are generally the same: economic, educational, social, and political. Immigration-related matters in these domains basically refer to the same issues. Thus, if comparative policy studies based on individual national cases can be regarded as naturally occurring experiments from which broader cross-national generalizations can be made, then the scope of this paper and its ability to provide information should allow for transnational transfer of knowledge and be useful in other contexts.

THE ISRAELI CASE

1. Background Data

Israel became independent in 1948. Its entire *raison d'etre* is to be a homeland for any person of the Jewish faith who wishes to join Israeli society.[5] The Law of Return, enacted in 1950 by the Knesset, gives a legal basis to the clause in the Declaration of Independence determining that "the State of Israel will be open to the immigration of Jews and in the gathering of Exiles."[6] It holds that "every Jew has the right to immigrate to the Land of Israel."[7] According to the Law of Return any person of Jewish faith is granted citizenship when s/he immigrates to Israel. As such, it is perhaps the most ambitious, if not heroic, legislation in human history. It

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is ambitious because it juxtaposes the Diaspora, which is vast in numbers and spreads all over the globe, to the Jewish population of Israel concentrated on a tiny area of 21,500 square km,[8] in the Middle East. From the very eve of statehood the country faced immigration waves on an unprecedented scale, necessitating the absorption of hundreds of thousands of immigrants by an existing population of merely 600,000 (a growth of 100% in the first two to three years and of 300% in the following ten years, reaching two million people in 1958). Experts in demography foresaw a maximum population growth of 100%. Up to the present, the population of Israel has multiplied tenfold, from almost 600,000 to over six million.

Moreover, immigration could never be predicted. On ethnic-ideological grounds, the State of Israel assumes the duty of saving Jewish people wherever they are in peril: 100,000 were brought to Israel from Yemen in 1951, 200,000 from Iraq in 1950, thousands from Egypt after the war of 1956, 35,000 from Ethiopia in 1984 and 1993, and approximately 800,000 from the FSU in a spell of less than six years, from 1989 to 1995. In 1989 the Israeli population was 4.5 million; in the six years 1990-1996 it increased to 5.7 million.[9]

According to the publications of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, following the collapse of the Communist regime in the Soviet Union, the wave of immigration of 1989-1995 added to Israel about 20% of its 1989 population. Close to 400,000 Soviet immigrants reached Israel within two years, from the end of 1989 to 1991. Of these, 160,000 were academics,[10] and 6,000[11] of them were scientists in various fields of science and technology. In comparison, in 1989 there were only some 8,000 scientists and research engineers employed in the civilian Israeli sector, including professors and research staff at universities. The majority of immigrant academics were university professors or research engineers who had to face, for instance, the problem of finding a suitable academic or research position.

2. Immigration Profile during Peak Immigration Flow 1989-1995

In the early and mid-1980s, the immigration influx to Israel was steady but ranged between 12,000 and 13,000 people per year. About 55% came from so-called "countries of distress" (COD)[12] and needed intensive social and financial support. In the last two months of 1989, a huge wave of immigration started flowing in and reached the unprecedented figure of 24,050 immigrants (77% from COD); in 1990 the figure was 199,516 (96% from COD) and in 1991 it was 176,000 (97% from COD). In the following years the immigration rate ranged from approximately 76,000 to 80,000 ***(Figure 1)***.[13]



FIGURE 1: Number of Immigrants *(Including Potential Immigrants)*

SOURCE: Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, 1996

Demographically, over 65% of the immigrants arriving in Israel between 1989 and 1995 were under the age of 45 and 36% of them were under 25. Only 13% were 65 and over *(Table 1)*. Although the age level was young, it was on the whole slightly older than the veteran population.[14]

In terms of education the immigrant population was characterized by a higher rate of higher education than the veteran Israeli population: 40.5% have 13 or more years of education compared with 24.2% of the veterans. The education level also influenced the occupational profile of the immigrants, about 60% of the workforce having worked in academic, scientific, or free professions compared with 28% of native Israelis.[15] According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, among the immigrants who came to Israel between 1989 and 1995 alone, were 68,100 engineers and architects, 30,900 teachers, 14,300 physicians and dentists, 14,100 recognized artists, musicians, and writers, and 14,700 nurses *(Table 2)*. They transcended the number of veteran Israelis in these professions.

TABLE 1: Immigrants From FSU By Age Group

Age Group	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total
0 - 24	4,700 (36.7%)	64,600 (34.9%)	50,700 (34.3%)	23,300 (35.8%)	24,700 (37.4%)	25,000 (36.7%)	23,300 (36.0%)	216,300 (35.5%)
25 - 44	4,600 (35.9%)	64,600 (34.9%)	47,000 (31.8%)	19,200 (29.5%)	18,700 (28.3%)	18,700 (27.5%)	17,900 (27.6%)	190,700 (31.3%)
45 - 54	900 (7.0%)	15,900 (8.6%)	15,000 (10.1%)	6,400 (9.8%)	5,900 (8.9%)	6,300 (9.3%)	7,600 (11.7%)	58,000 (9.5%)
55 - 64	1,000 (7.8%)	17,600 (9.5%)	14,700 (9.9%)	6,700 (10.3%)	7,500 (11.3%)	8,300 (12.2%)	7,100 (11.0%)	62,900 (10.3%)
65 +	1,600 (12.5%)	22,500 (12.1%)	20,400 (13.8%)	9,500 (14.6%)	9,300 (14.1%)	9,800 (14.4%)	8,900 (13.7%)	82,000 (13.4%)
Total FSU Immigrants	12,800 (100.0%)	185,200 (100.0%)	147,800 (100.0%)	65,100 (100.0%)	66,100 (100.0%)	68,100 (100.0%)	64,800 (100.0%)	609,900 (100.0%)

SOURCE: Central Bureau of Statistics

TABLE 2: Immigrants From FSU by Occupation

Occupation	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total
Engineers	1,400 (10.9%)	24,400 (13.2%)	18,500 (12.5%)	6,600 (10.1%)	5,200 (7.9%)	6,000 (8.8%)	6,000 (9.3%)	68,100 (11.2%)
Physicians & Dentists	500 (3.9%)	5,900 (3.2%)	3,500 (2.4%)	1,200 (1.8%)	1,100 (1.7%)	1,000 (1.5%)	1,100 (1.7%)	14,300 (2.3%)
Musicians & Artists	500 (3.9%)	4,900 (2.6%)	3,500 (2.4%)	1,400 (2.2%)	1,300 (2.0%)	1,300 (2.0%)	1,200 (1.9%)	14,100 (2.3%)
Nurses & Para-medical	300 (2.3%)	4,100 (2.2%)	3,600 (2.4%)	1,500 (2.3%)	1,700 (2.6%)	1,800 (2.6%)	1,700 (2.6%)	14,700 (2.4%)
Teachers	500 (3.9%)	10,000 (5.4%)	7,700 (5.2%)	3,100 (4.8%)	3,000 (4.5%)	3,400 (5.0%)	3,200 (4.9%)	30,900 (5.1%)
Total FSU Immigrants	12,800 (100.0%)	185,200 (100.0%)	147,800 (100.0%)	65,100 (100.0%)	66,100 (100.0%)	68,100 (100.0%)	64,800 (100.0%)	609,900 (100.0%)

SOURCE: Central Bureau of Statistics

POLICY PROBLEMS AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

1. Policy Solutions: Social and Educational Assistance Policy

In Israel, as in any other immigration context, socialization and suitable employment were key problems.[16] So were language mastery and communication skills. Mentality was different too – the newcomers being more strict and custodial as opposed to the very open Israeli way *(Horowits, 1989)*.

Moreover, the Israeli government has always considered immigrant absorption a fundamental responsibility of the state, and treated immigrant integration and employment as a major commitment. In 1968 it founded the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption to orchestrate this approach to immigrant absorption policy. At that time the new ministry, together with the ministries of Housing, Labor and Welfare, Education, Science, Technology and Art, and of Health, took charge of the first stages of absorption. From 1920 to 1968 implementation of immigration policy had been in the hands of the World Zionist Organization and its executive branch, the Jewish Agency NGO.[17] In the 1980s the Jewish Agency was weakened by a drop in the funds raised and this process ultimately strengthened the position of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption. In 1985 the contest for leadership in the immigrant absorption arena led to a call by the director general of the ministry for changes in immigration absorption and the introduction of the "direct absorption" policy, which would avoid the "bottleneck" absorption centers – the stronghold of the Jewish Agency.

Immigration, at the social level, involves an array of problems and needs that immigrants have to face on arrival in the new country. They range across food and accommodation, language mastery, understanding the local culture and rules, and integration in the labor market. In Israel, prior to 1990 the absorption centers were believed to address these problems. Since on immigrants' arrivals these needs are usually acute and urgent, and since immigrants are not eligible for the welfare services that veteran citizens can be granted, most immigration-receiving countries as far away as Canada, Europe, and Australia have set up so called "post-arrival services", "settlement" or "resettlement programs", "integration" or "absorption packages" which vary in purpose and extent *(Cox 1985; Hammar 1985; Baldwin-Edwards 1991; Lanphier and Lukomskyj 1994)*. While some countries prefer to blur their official immigration policy and related support programs, others, such as Israel, Australia, Canada, Holland, and Sweden, follow a different path.

In fact, a combination of two absorption policies exists in these countries: indirect and direct absorption tracks, although the direct approach is prevalent in the countries whose policies are overt. In Israel, in view of the different populations who immigrated over the years, the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption adhered to both at various periods of time: "indirect absorption" (implying close centralized support and control mainly for immigrants from COD); and "direct absorption" (set cash payments), intended mainly for immigrants from Western countries in the 1980s and fully adopted after the 1990s wave of immigration from former USSR. The latter policy was in line with recent economic tendencies relating to privatization, and it served the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption in its political power contests with the former immigration support network, the Jewish Agency. While the indirect absorption policy initiated in the late 1960s promoted the idea of "absorption centers", and controlled benefits and services provided according to qualifying conditions, the new policy attempted to bypass them.

In Israel, as in other countries, the "absorption-baskets" were conditional and rather small, especially in cash benefits. "Indirect absorption" was clearly directed by conditioning rationales. Such conditioning approaches are particularly obvious, for instance, in Canada, where AAP benefits are given only to immigrants meeting certain class adherence criteria, or in Australia where certain benefits had to be balanced by veteran Australians' stated responsibility to repay the state for the social services costs *(Biggs, 1994)*.

In Israel, under "indirect absorption", and in this case like other immigration-receiving countries, dozens of absorption centers were set up to serve as hostels where immigrants were housed from the day of their

arrival in Israel. These facilities were available for six months but in fact some immigrants took advantage of the housing facilities for a several years.[18] A similar approach has been taken, for instance, in Australia where hostels are specifically provided for immigrants, and in countries such as France and Holland which, respectively, established cheap housing programs or allocated part of the public housing system to immigrants *(Entzinger 1985; Verbunt 1985; Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 1986; Hein 1991).*

In Israel, in addition, under this policy the immigrants were provided with meals, day centers, ulpans (Hebrew classes for adults), information services on employment, taxation, etc., and a living allowance jointly paid by the Jewish Agency and the ministry of Immigrant Absorption. The level of the allowance depended on the Agency's financial status and the number of immigrants in any particular year. It should be noted, that during most of the 1980s the immigration tc Israel steadily ranged between 10,000 and 20,000 immigrants per year.

The "direct absorption" policy promoted self-reliance. Initially, the "direct absorption" policy was intended for immigrants from Western countries and a limited number of Soviet immigrants, and was successfully tested as a pilot project by the Jewish Agency in the mid-1980s *(Katz et al, 1987).* The "direct absorption" policy was first initiated in 1985 *(Leshem et al., 1986)* by the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption following criticism of the absorption centers, a fall in the number of immigrants, and the aforementioned power contests between the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption and the Jewish Agency.[19] A tentative document in this respect was published by the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption in 1986 *(Leshem et al., 1986).* This track offered highly subsidized apartments, minimally furnished and equipped, and a rent allowance. Children's education, health insurance and expenses for studying Hebrew were also provided. The newcomers were expected to take evening Hebrew classes and fend for themselves in other respects. Until they found work or for up to 24 months a monthly allowance was provided.[20] Apartments were offered for sale with substantial incentives, mainly in development towns and near Jerusalem and in the West Bank (many small West Bank settlements are only half an hour away from Tel Aviv). A by-product of this policy was not always in line with its intent: in most cases the immigrants preferred to receive the same incentives in the vicinity of the two main metropolises of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and chose not to remain in development towns. Those who stayed did not affect the socio-economic structure, as had been hoped, although the cultural infrastructure was influenced. Studies by *Demian (1989)* and *Peri and Lasar (1990)* showed that immigrants involved in this absorption track integrated quickly and were highly satisfied. They did not indicate dissatisfaction with the relative absence of support services.

In view of this outcome, particularly when in 1990 the influx from FSU started to pour in, the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption declared this track its preferred absorption policy. It also implied that the full responsibility for the absorption process in the first two years was of the government rather than of the Jewish Agency NGO. Under this new support scheme for all immigrants under the "direct absorption" policy the government rented apartments at the going market rate and leased them to immigrants for up to two years. Immigrants could rent apartments in any part of the country; they were granted up to a certain monthly sum for rent, and for the first six months, on certification that the immigrant was attending an ulpan, s/he received a monthly subsistence allowance.

Another by-product of this policy involved the bureaucracy, which was overwhelmed by the massive immigration from FSU at the beginning of the 1990s and by its budget impacts. Keeping track of all the conditions that would allow the conditional payments became impossible with about 20,000 immigrants arriving in Israel every month rather than about 20,000 per year in the 1980s. Moreover, with no previous drawer plans and with a modest existing infrastructure, which included some 7,000 beds in absorption centers, and some 10,000 housing units in public housing projects, the bureaucracy could not offer adequate absorption solutions. Obviously, the social support scheme had to be changed and the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption decided in 1989 to introduce the "direct absorption" policy and the "absorption basket" to all. In fact, this was based on the computation of the average sum previously

given to immigrants. To start with, it amounted to a subsistence allowance for six months (later to be changed to one year), rent subsidy for the first year, travel expenses to and from the ulpan for six months, certain schooling costs for children depending on the number in the family and their ages, health insurance, a customs grant, some furniture and household utensils, and the cost of writing and translating resumes. After the first year the immigrant could pay rent out of his/her own resources, or purchase an apartment or mobile home with a 50% subsidized mortgage, or receive public housing (only in development areas in the south or north of the country) *(Adler, 1993)*.

In fact, the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption finally set the tone by completely replacing the old indirect absorption policy in July 1990. Finally, in 1994 it supported the 1994 Absorption Package Law, which linked the package to the cost-of-living index and evaded devaluation and fluctuations in the package. Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s a three-member family received about $10,000 for their first year in the country (compared with the $5,000 minimal annual wage rate in Israel). An immigrant family[21] of three received in the first 7 months about $1450 (while a veteran Israeli family of three that is eligible for income support receives only about $790.)

Funded jointly by the government and by the Jewish Agency NGO, whose budgets changed every year, the package suffered cuts and changes in the first years of implementation. To avoid this situation, in 1992 it was decided that three quarters of the package would be funded by the state and a quarter by the Jewish Agency as a loan. The only conditioning imposed on the immigrant family was to stay in Israel for at least five years. No means or unemployment criteria applied. In many ways this package was more generous and non-conditional than any welfare support package given to veteran Israelis, who had to prove unemployment and lack of sources of income, or to those who were long-term recipients of income support. These arrangements caused young, native-born Israelis to demand that they, having risked their lives serving in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) for three to five years, should also be given these benefits. Resentment, particularly in low socio-economic areas, became rife.

Indeed the burden of the "absorption basket" on the state budget became considerable, particularly in the first two years of the 1990s when the influx of immigration reached about 200,000 immigrants per year. According to the Bank of Israel (1992), at that time expenditure on the "absorption basket" reached about 0.7% of the GNP and approximately $700 million. To be able to provide these budgets, in 1991 the government had to enforce a three-year 5% "absorption levy" on income tax imposed on all veteran Israeli taxpayers. Despite what might have been expected, surveys by the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption in 1992 showed that the veteran Israelis were adhering to the national ideology and were willing to accept both the additional burden and the arrangements made by the government for immigrant absorption *(Demian and Rosenbaum-Tamari, 1994)*.

In the political arena, both the left-wing Labor Party and the right-wing Likud party, as well as leading figures in the Israeli economic, social, and political arenas, supported the free market principles, non-intervention of the state, privatization, and individual enterprise, promoted in the West by the New Right. Accordingly, the "direct absorption" policy, which matched these principles, was embraced and supported in the political arenas as well.

Although the "direct absorption" and "absorption basket" policies introduced in the early 1990s were dramatic conceptual and social shifts, the authorities have not as yet obtained indications of better integration of immigrants. Nonetheless, these policies absolved the government from providing any infrastructure, suited the free-market orientation in the housing market, and allowed immigrants to live in areas of their choice rather than in those imposed on them; at the same time, their entry into the free market was facilitated.

The main by-products are quite visible: first, we note a high immigrant concentration in central parts of Israel, mainly around the metropolises of Tel Aviv and Haifa, 50% and 20% respectively.[22] Second, the consequences of this policy change followed basic economic logic: the demand for housing, mainly rental apartments, grew, and accordingly rents increased for both immigrants[23] and veterans; as a result the overall annual cost of living went

up, again, to the veteran Israeli's dismay. Third, former downtown or commercial areas started being inhabited again; the majority of the new residents there were immigrants, some highly educated. They became the neighbors of a very low socio-economic local population, thus changing if not the economic then the social and cultural profile of those neighborhoods. This situation is not unique to Israel. Immigrant populations who start inhabiting certain neighborhoods in Toronto, Montreal, Miami, Berlin, or Amsterdam, change the demographic, cultural, and socio-economic status of those areas.[24] Another effect in the main cities was the higher degree of unemployment among immigrants, or their employment as cheap unskilled labor. The cultural setting in these cities, and throughout Israel, was radically affected *(see discussion below)*.

While division of responsibility among the ministries gave jurisdiction to the ministries of Immigrant Absorption and of Housing over the two absorption tracks, the Ministry of Education had jurisdiction over education policy. It had first of all to solve language and socialization problems, which in the immigration context were considered closely interconnected. Similarly, for instance, to the provinces in Canada, particularly Quebec, where language acquisition by adults was regarded as a prerequisite for absorption. Hebrew classes or ulpan courses were given to adults for five months to ten months with 500 hours of instruction during which time the immigrants were financed by the "absorption basket."[25] The ulpans were held at absorption centers or other study centers throughout the country. The goals of the ulpans are to provide the learner with about 1,000 words, the ability to carry out a simple conversation and read and write basic texts, and expose the immigrant to encounters with the new country and its people through some trips to various parts of the country.

Those in special professions could attend a stage-two professional Hebrew course for an extra five months. As of 1999, special ulpans have been organized for certain professions (engineers, physicians, paramedics, construction workers, etc.). In these ulpans immigrants receive an additional 50-100 hours dedicated to the technical language of the specific professions together with basic knowledge of computers. Evaluation studies undertaken in these classes showed that attendance, incentive to learn, and achievements were higher in these groups than in the regular ulpan groups. While studying, the newcomers received financial support from the state and were financed by the "absorption basket." Statistics show that about 70% of the immigrants decided to join the ulpan classes, and that the dropout rate was approximately 25% *(Adler, 1999)*.

Beyond language learning, in 1995, for instance, a total budget of approximately $9 million was allocated for various absorption activities within local communities – not counting other budgets provided by municipalities or various agencies. Over 25% of this sum was allocated to social and cultural activities at additional Hebrew acquisition schools, about 20% to preserving traditions, and about the same amounts, respectively, to enrichment programs for the 3-18-year-old age groups, and to increase interaction among veteran and immigrant youth.[26]

As part of a special overt attempt at integration, in Israel, as in some other immigration-recipient countries such as Australia and Sweden, where additional services and support infrastructure are provided, special attention was given to children and teenagers *(Lundberg Lithman, 1985; Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs, 1982)*.

On arrival, children were immediately integrated into regular school classes. They were offered additional Hebrew language classes for new immigrants. Each school was allocated $150-$300 per immigrant child, according to age and country of origin, for special support and assistance in social absorption. Since the Ministry of Education also retrained and employed teachers from FSU, these teachers served as tutors and advisors for the new immigrant students. High-school immigrant students were allowed to take some matriculation exams in their mother tongue and to be examined in subjects they had studied in their country of origin[27] instead of other elective subjects *(Gewa-May, 1991a; 1991b)*. The Ministry of Immigrant Absorption financed private lessons either in small groups or on an individual basis, and in cooperation with municipalities and volunteer groups it organized various social activities including field trips and summer camps.

Particular effort was invested in preparing the youth for military service, which is compulsory in Israel after high school, and for higher education studies. Special summer camps and activities of youth movement counselors with teenage immigrants became a high-priority provision of this policy.[28] Special guidance, rights, and benefits were allotted to teenage immigrant soldiers during their IDF service. They were under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Absorption, which also financed special staff to deal with soldiers' problems and difficulties.[29] Since the compulsory army service for teenagers is considered a social and cultural melting pot in Israel, it was hoped that this treatment would have a positive effect on these young immigrants' integration into Israeli society. About 16,000 immigrant students in institutions of higher education in 1993-1996 were from FSU, and most of them went on to graduate studies. The government and the Jewish Agency NGO finance the immigrant students' tuition fees and provide a special monthly allowance. Demands for similar treatment for veteran students were raised in the October-November 1998 students' strike. These students, the majority aged over 22 and older than the immigrant students, whose army service could be deferred until after completion of undergraduate studies, called for similar right and benefits. The topic was also one of the main issues in the 1999 Labor party election campaign. Ehud Barak, the party leader and former army Chief of Staff, assured the students that those who served in the IDF would be entitled to special rights as students and that in time tuition fees would be abolished entirely. After the Labor election victory the new Minister of Finance began by announcing that special subsidized loans would be given to veteran Israeli students.

2. Institutional Approaches and Employment Policies

The Israeli government adheres to the view that employment is a pivotal requirement for social absorption. This issue is also largely considered the responsibility of the state. Particularly in the 1990s, in face of the great immigration wave, the government believed that the employment problems were far too acute and could not possibly be handled by non-government agencies alone.[30] Like the situation in other countries, the employment problem in those years presented a major challenge for the state on the macro-economic level. Its related dilemmas ranged from lack of job security, or lower salaries in jobs offered to immigrants, to lack of suitable jobs in academic professions, which led to the need to create incentives and demand.

Several entities within the government became responsible for these policy concerns: the ministries of Labor and Welfare, of Science and Technology, of Education and Culture, of Health, and of Finance all participated in varying degrees of coordination with the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption. Decisions were taken under obvious budgetary constraints, considerations of national priorities, and objective conditions. With 60% of the FSU immigrant workforce in the academic and scientific professions, and with an unemployment rate of 38.5% among the immigrants in 1990-1992 (which decreased to 9.6% in 1999 but which is still higher than the 8.2% rate among the veteran population), a comprehensive training and retraining policy was eventually developed. The main effort was devoted to implementing this policy (although over time there was a need to re-evaluate the effectiveness of these programs), and to finding suitable employment for special groups.[31]

In 1999, the outlay by the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption for the courses it runs was about $8 million, with another $4 million for the subsistence allowance paid to immigrants in the country less than two years. Immigrants who have been in Israel for longer are eligible for a subsistence allowance through the Unemployment Insurance program of the National Insurance Institute. The allowances are lower than, but of similar order to, those received by veteran unemployed Israelis (about $790 per month for a family of three). Although there are no specific accounts of the costs of the courses given by the Ministry of Labor, these are estimated at $40-50 million, including the subsistence allowance *(Adler, 1999)*.

In the 1990s the chief problem was that of immigrants in the "technical" and "liberal" professions, rates of absorption into the profession being as low as 35%.[32] The absorption experience of the early 1990s was clearly less than satisfactory, both from the immigrants' point of view *(Dominitz, 1997; Paltiel, et al., 1997)* and in

terms of potential output lost to the Israeli economy. Finding ways of improving this situation was one of the challenges before policy makers.

3. Training, Re-training, Special Projects, and Incentives to Employers

The actual employment and training or retraining programs were run by the Ministry of Labor. The Ministry of Absorption allocated funds to subsidize immigrants' wages for a certain period of time so that employers – whether private or state-owned enterprises – would be encouraged to hire their services. The entity created by the Prime Minister's Office in 1973, which dealt with the professional needs, training, and employment of immigrant scientists, was transferred to the Ministry of Science and Technology. Under its auspices, retraining for teaching, industry, or related fields was initiated at universities: engineers and scientists were mainly exposed to advanced computers and updating in their field of expertise; railway engineers were retrained as mechanical engineers, physicians who could not pass the very demanding theory and practical exams for accreditation in Israel were retrained for nursing; scientists such as physicists and mathematicians were channeled to teaching science subjects in high schools, where there was a need for highly qualified science teachers, and the like;[33] teachers were trained in different pedagogical and methodological approaches, from what they knew to what was acceptable in the West *(Geva-May, 1994b)*. The following are some policy solutions that emerged in that strenuous context. Immigration problems of cross-national scope and their Israeli answers are studied below.

The "employment-problematic" sectors were scientists, engineers, physicians, and artists. Like the situation in Germany, for instance, despite the significant human capital that these immigrants could offer, the Israeli market was unable to take full advantage of their potential.

In 1995, for example, 10,965 scientists were registered at the Center of Absorption in Science; 8,250 were employed, but the majority not at their previous professional status *(Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, 1996)*.[34] Of these, about 1,800 were placed in jobs at universities, approximately 1,400 more in the private sector, and some 3,500 in various scientific or quasi-scientific jobs. A study by the Gutman Institute encompassing a random scientist population showed that the target employing institutions were universities, technological "incubators", industry, research institutions, colleges, and hospitals.[35] By 1999, 13,000 immigrant scientists and R&D engineers had registered with this Center.

The Center of Absorption in Science, initially founded in 1973 in the wake of what was then considered a large wave of immigration (75,000 between 1971 to 1973), aimed to prepare the immigrant scientists for entry into the workforce as quickly as possible and to adapt their professional background to Western approaches and technologies. In the 1990s it mainly helped the immigrant scientists to write resumes, determine professional profiles, and direct them to potential employers. A member of the Center's staff accompanied them to job interviews and negotiated terms of employment. This person likewise set the financial subsidy received by the employer towards the scientist's wages and benefits for a period of one to four years and the budget needed to cover his/her research costs in the projects in which the scientist was to be involved. The "mentor" continued his or her connection with the scientist after his or her employment to assist, determine progress, change budgets or make other changes in the program, or, in extreme cases, cease the employment and begin the process with a new employer *(Adler, 1999)*. According to *Adler (1999)*, the average total package for one scientist was $30,000 and the total budget allocated for this purpose in 1999 was $40 million, with an obligation to increase it to $45 million in 2000.

A special major project intended to assist employment comprised a limited number of gifted scientists, some 300, who from 1995 onwards were included in the so-called "Giladi program." By its means the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption assisted universities and other research institutions that did not have the required financial resources to extend the period of employment of outstanding scientists for another three years. From 1996 another 120 scientists were included in the program.

TABLE 3: Employment of Scientists Retrained to Teach in High Schools

Re-training:	Employment Post Certification in:								
Institution	Number of certificate recipients	Junior High	High	13th Grade	College	Adult	University research/ teaching	Factories	Both Junior High & Senior High
Beer-Seva*	53 (+7)	8	54	0	5	5	0	3	25
Bar-Ilan	34	10	10	10	10	0	20	0	40
Hebrew University	30	17	58	0	0	0	8	0	17
Technion	23	0	47	11	15	5	11	11	0
Tel-Aviv	27	33	67	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total out of 174 recipients of teaching certificate*	167 (+7)	11	48	4	7	4	3	17	18

SOURCE: Central Bureau of Statistics

* NOTE: Seven participants were tested and received their teacher certificate at a later date

TABLE 4: Scientists in the Giladi Program

Scientific Area	Technology and Exact Sciences	Social Sciences and Humanities	Life and Medical Sciences	Total
Universities	173	23	56	252
Colleges	11	2	1	14
Hospitals	-	-	10	10
Research Institutes	11	3	10	24

SOURCE: Ministry of Immigrant Absorption

Of the total number of engineers[36] only 25% ended up actually working as engineers, and 31% were absorbed into industry. Others, about 20% respectively, were integrated into building, business, services, and consultation, with about 30% in various public services.[37] One of the chief concerns before policy makers with regard to this population was to determine the engineers' professional level owing to the significant differences among the engineering institutions of FSU from which they had graduated. This pertained especially to professional updating. Of the overall number of immigrant engineers, 76% applied to the Registrar in Israel, and 85% of these were recognized and registered in the Engineers' Directory. In reality, this proportion was equal to 65% of the overall number of people who on arrival declared that they were engineers.

In line with the absorption policy, the type of assistance provided by the state included mainly retraining and/or updating in their field of expertise in special programs offered by universities, counseling within the Entrepreneurship Unit of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, and primary support for a number of innovative ideas within the Bashan project[38] and the Technological Incubators program.[39] These two programs were intended to further the employment of engineers, to establish a pool of ideas and inventions by immigrant engineers and scientists, and to lay the foundations for or to reinforce start-up factories.

The Entrepreneurship Unit was responsible for the development of both infrastructure assistance and a supportive subsidized environment for the immigrant

entrepreneurs. The unit also acquainted the immigrants with the Israeli and Western business world, provided counseling and training, and made recommendations to the Ministry for grants. The Incubator program (similar to technological research farms) sought to promote inventions and patents, and establish small industrial enterprises comprising both veteran Israelis and immigrant engineers. It was hoped that after a period of three years they would become financially independent. As to whether anything can be learned from this program, the figures show that at the end of 1995, out of approximately 700 proposals 120 successfully passed the stage of technical/economic investment and were referred to the Israel Innovation Center, development centers, and factories. Government loans and centralized advisory services were granted to entrepreneur engineers and innovative start-up businesses. In 1996, for instance, a budget of $5.5 million was allocated for this purpose alone. In the same year, five such initiatives were in advanced stages of establishing a company. In 1996 the number of immigrants applying to these advisory centers exceeded 5,000. In 1998 the Entrepreneurship Unit approved 560 loans to open new businesses for a budget of $3 million, compared with an average of 350 in the previous four years.

The other sector within the special occupational group was physicians, dentists, and nurses.[40/41] The main problem was the same: a total of 14,590 physicians immigrated to Israel between 1989 and 1995. In 1990 and 1991 alone the figures were 5,820 and 3,370 respectively. The number of dentists who arrived was 1,575; there were 14,341 nurses, 1,831 paramedics, and 1,606 pharmacists; the majority immigrated in 1990-1991.

Of the total number of practitioners in these professions, almost 60% of the doctors, 80% percent of the dentists, and 90% of the nurses were licensed after passing stiff obligatory practical and theory exams.[42] In consequence, many doctors worked as nurses or paramedics, or provided so-called "alternative medicine" which does not require a license and can be conducted privately. Almost 4,000 people were licensed in paramedical professions, the majority being former doctors.[43] In fact, this was very much in line with the needs of the health care market and with the "pockets of need" identified by the Ministry of Health. For instance, as a result of such a needs survey, the retraining programs for x-ray technicians and geriatric nurses provided 100% employment to trainees.

Almost 16,000 immigrants declared themselves artists on arrival. Of these, about 7,250 were recognized as such and about 4,200 more as outstanding artists. This huge number of recognized artists who immigrated to Israel presented two main challenges at the absorption-policy level: to provide appropriate employment for them and to take advantage of their presence to develop the

FIGURE 2: Physicians, Dentists, and Nurses and Their Licensing in the Medical Profession



SOURCE: Ministry of Health

Israeli cultural infrastructure and artistic education. The assistance tracks offered to them were sponsored by the Ministry of Absorption, the Ministry of Science, Technology and Arts, and the Jewish Agency. The artists were assisted in purchasing instruments and equipment, in professional training, and in gaining exposure through concerts, exhibitions, performances, and writers' evenings; they were also helped to develop employment sources. In all, the Center for the Absorption of Immigrant Artists provided such opportunities by expanding artistic and cultural institutions for approximately 3,000 artists.[44] Symphony orchestras were assembled in almost every major town in Israel, the Opera House and its tradition in Israel was reinforced, and many artists served as classical music teachers in remote development towns or Arab villages. In this respect, the European classical tradition was greatly strengthened; to a certain extent, the cultural balance was redressed in the variegated Israeli cultural spectrum.

A universal and major employment problem is that of mature immigrants. In Israel the problem of finding jobs for those aged 45 and older existed in all areas of expertise.[45] The Ministry of Absorption's explanation was that "not even a growing economy can provide jobs for those above the age of 45."[46] Such axioms do not supply operational solutions. The same source agreed that this situation was linked to the preconception that people of this age were not profitable to hire; in turn this resulted in a significant loss to the economy of an average of 15 work years of at least 20,000 immigrants, many of whom were at the peak of their career and professional ability. Obviously, this circumstance exerted its own negative effect on the absorption of their families. The initiatives taken by the Ministry of Absorption and Ministry of Labor included mainly job fairs and employment projects. About 1,800 immigrants were involved in these programs.[47] Additional but sporadic solutions were also offered by NGO immigrant organizations, or by venture firms and other private enterprises.

Immigrants in academic professions who were unable to find a job in or close to their original profession were eligible to attend a Center for Employment and Counseling. The two-month program provided additional Hebrew language instruction, additional professional terminology, lectures concerned with employment, job search workshops, professional site visits, job placement services, and counseling by occupational psychologists. A study carried out in 1994 by the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption showed that the majority of participants in these programs found work within one year of completing the program *(Adler, 1999)*.

A special program for encouraging the employment of older immigrant engineers was initiated in 1994-1997 and comprised about 200 immigrants every year. The older the immigrant engineer, and the higher the position she or he was offered, the higher the subsidy. It ranged between 50%-100% of the minimum wage for a period of 6-18 months. Some 350 other academic professionals employed in certain professions in the public sector were also able to receive a sum equal to the minimum wage for a period of 6-12 months. These two projects alone were funded jointly by the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption and the Joint Distribution Committee (a North American Jewish NGO) and cost the Ministry approximately $4 million per year.

This program was part of the Encouragement of Employment project started at the beginning of the 1990s and which in July 1991 was enacted as the Encouragement of Employment Law for a three-year period. The law was intended to encourage employers to employ immigrants through a series of subsidies and incentives. To prevent friction between veteran Israelis and immigrants, the incentives provided through the law were similar whether the employer hired immigrants or unemployed veteran Israelis. For instance, if an employer added five workers over a period of a three months and employed the additional worker for at least one quarter, and was not financed by the state or local authority by more than 30%, the government added a third of the worker's wages over a period of up to two years (but not more than $420 and $280 per month in the first and second year respectively). This incentive was found to have assisted especially in employing immigrant professionals at least for a period of two years.

Hard data show that while, for instance, between 1990 and 1993 the unemployment of veteran Israelis was between 8%-9%, the unemployment of immigrants ranged between approximately 23% in 1991 and 38% in 1992. But in 1993 the rate among immigrants dropped to about 15%, and by 1999 it had declined to about 8.7%. Note that

during the same period the unemployment of immigrant academics was higher (35% to 41% in 1991 and 1992 respectively) than that of the non-academics (28% to 34% in 1991 and 1992 respectively). In 1993 the employment curve in the non-academic professions descended to 12%, while among academics it still reached an average of 20%. Yet in both cases the year showing the most dramatic fall in immigrant unemployment was 1992 (from 41% to 22% among academics, and from 35% to 12% among non-academics).[48]

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS:
Immigration Influence – Social, Cultural, Economic, Political

To sum up, Israel's position on immigration might be considered different from that of any other country in that its very existence is based on its duty to accept, grant citizenship to, and assist any immigrant of the Jewish faith. Indeed, this supersedes any other considerations such as age, profession, and financial status, or any other threshold entrance requirements. Moreover, the state's commitment to immigration and absorption, the huge waves of immigration that Israel faces every so often at short notice, and the economy of the country, from poor in the beginning to not too strong now, have made it necessary to centralize and control absorption policy. This has fostered control of assistance and control over emerging problems.

Despite the commonly accepted belief that large immigration waves impose an insupportable burden on the host country's economy, and that immigrants substitute veterans in the labor market, the 1990s immigration proved, at the macro-economic level, that this wave of immigration has benefited the Israeli market. In this respect, at the comparative level, the Israeli findings reinforce data obtained in other immigration-recipient countries and augment the literature refuting claims that immigration implies an additional burden and stealing of jobs from veterans – a belief that in many cases has caused waves of resentment, if not hatred.

Studies undertaken in Israel, such as the *Beenstock and Fisher Report (1996)*[49] show that the wave of immigration brought about a higher GDP and higher investment level. Although it affected real wages by about 8.7 % between 1990-1994 (about 3% per year) and, it may be argued, this affected the lower classes, it can also be contended that since "real wages" became flexible, it prevented a rise in the unemployment level among the veterans as well. According to the *Beenstock and Fisher* study the National Sector and Business Sector Product grew by an average of 5.6% and 7% respectively, private consumption by 3% per year, and investments in the business sector by 15% per year, investments by 14-15% in fixed assets in the business sector, and by almost 40% in housing. Investments brought about an increase of 7.4% in the business sector. Exports also increased by 0.8% as a result of the Accumulated Capital Stock.[50] Furthermore, regarding the security problems of Israel, which necessitate, after compulsory service, reserve duty by men in the IDF up to the age of 45, the wave of immigration may allow this burden to be spread more evenly through use of the immigrant human capital and the release from service of veteran Israelis. Moreover, usually younger than the average veteran population, the newcomers are productive (and tax paying) in the market for a longer period of time, and will take less advantage of health care services and pension benefits in the long run. These findings support previous studies undertaken in Israel *(Simon, et al., 1977, p. 93)* and which assert that:

> *"An earlier study of the economic contribution of Soviet immigrants to Israel found also that the immigrant families' discounted net balance with the veteran population is positive by the third year, becoming very large and positive in successive years ... We conclude that (their) acceptance ... is a healthy, beneficial policy for the economy and for the standard of living of the veteran Israelis."*

Studies conducted mainly in the United States and Germany on the effect of immigration on the local economy show the same thing: the "belief" that immigrants substitute veterans in employment opportunities and pose a burden on the local economy is basically unfounded.[51] Like the studies carried out mainly in Germany and the United States, studies undertaken in Israel by *C. Chiswick (1987), Beenstock and Fisher (1996), and Rosen (1994)* show that immigrants compliment rather than substitute veterans. As in other countries, the initial wages of immigrants are lower than those of the veterans, especially those of the academics

(by almost 50% compared with veterans' wages; non-professionals' wages are 30% less), but their willingness to participate in the labor market is higher than that of the veterans. Although literature in Israel and elsewhere identifies a period of up to 20 years for reaching the same wage status, the general tendency in the last wave of immigration in Israel is of a wage increase of about 2%-3% per year. No studies exist on the direct relationship between the support system offered to immigrants in Israel and the fall in unemployment, wage increase rate, job market participation, and strong positive impact on the economy at the macro level. But the financial support, language and socialization guidance, and subsidized incentives may well be presumed to have played a significant part in this situation in Israel.

In the United States and Germany, studies show that although the economies are not burdened, immigration shows only a limited impact at the macro-economic level. According to *Beenstock and Fisher,* this may be due to the extent of the local market, i.e., immigration may have a greater effect on smaller markets. Another explanation in the Israeli context may, again, be the support and investment networks described above. Note that in Israel much of the support infrastructure is based on welfare budgets partly funded by NGOs.

The policy of "direct absorption" of immigration, which is in line with the orientation of the Israeli policy makers towards free market and privatization, and which replaced the centralized approach, has in recent years also yielded an unexpected by-product, namely the accumulation of immigrant populations in the main cities. It has also caused housing and employment problems in those areas. On the other hand, it has reinforced some of the socially weak neighborhoods or facilitated political and demographic intervention in areas of concern.

The studies and figures presented above set out hard data and do not take into consideration the micro-economic impacts of the human capital. *Friedberg (1995)* rightly claims that this facet of immigration makes a great difference on impacts on economies:

> *"... if immigrations have little human capital, their impact is akin to that of faster population growth in slowing per capita growth. If immigrant human capital levels are higher than natives' by a sufficient amount, growth will be speeded up..."*

As in Central Europe, particularly Germany, in Israel the unexpectedly high human quality of the immigration from FSU between 1989 and 1995, consisting mainly of academics, posed employment problems, but it also reinforced the human capital of the state and its quality. Notions such as science and technology farms or "incubators", retraining of scientists as teachers, assistance in entrepreneurship, etc., or ideas sought by public servants, the Bank of Israel, the judiciary, and scholars, like the export of human capital, entrepreneurial guidance, and greater coordination between ministries and agencies *(Geva-May and Dean, 1998)* can maximize the economic utility of immigration. A number of such initiatives offering incentives to employers affected the demand curve of the Israeli market in areas not particularly sought after before the 1990s wave of immigration. These policies and programs were ultimately formulated as laws or appendixes to laws, such as the Encouragement of Employment Law (1991) the Encouragement of Research and Development Law (1984, 1988, 1996), and the Encouragement of Capital Investments Law (1990, 1997). These promoted a significantly higher demand for immigrants, higher employment of them, a steep fall in their unemployment (from almost 40% to about 8%), and higher utilization of the immigrant human capital.

Culturally, the 1990s immigration offered an unprecedented boost to arts and culture in Israel. True, some artists still play their instruments in malls, but in the special case of artists the direct intervention and support policy has proved helpful for a significant number of them. Symphony orchestras in almost every town, classical education – in music, ballet, painting, a wide array of performances and learning opportunities in these field, have already had an impact on the Israeli varied melting-pot culture.

Politically, the orientation of the Soviet immigrants has proven particularly high. Nathan Sharansky and others formed an immigrants' party (Yisrael be'aliya in Hebrew, a play on words meaning both "Israel in Immigration" and "Israel on the Rise") before the last Knesset (Parliament) elections of June 1996, on the basis of defending immigrants' rights. In that first campaign they won nine Knesset seats. Two of the party's members became ministers, the Minister of Immigrant Absorption

and the Minister of Industry and Trade. Moreover, beyond the fact that both positions are of importance for the immigrants' interests, the party had political power in that it assured the government coalition a majority in the Knesset.

Before the 1999 elections another Russian immigrants' party was formed, Yisrael Beteynu (in translation "Israel is Our Home"). In fact, this splinter of the Likud party did not join the coalition and weakened the power of the original immigrants' party, which, as they won only four seats in the Knesset, could obtain only one ministerial seat in the government. Nevertheless, their demand for the Ministry of Internal Affairs was met. This, in their view, gave them a powerful hold on immigration, citizen rights, and religious recognition issues which had been problematic as long as this ministry was headed by the religious party Shas. Although both immigrant parties claimed to represent other ethnic fractions, particularly the Ethiopian immigrants, the representation of the latter was very modest.

In order to ensure immigrant voters' support, the main parties, the winning left-wing Labor party and the right-wing Likud party, allocated a safe seat to an immigrant representative. Political power and impact depends on constituency, and in 1999 the new immigrant constituency numbered over a million people.

Throughout the 1990s immigrants looking for housing and employment solutions, and apprised of the incentives offered them, settled more than willingly in the West Bank, thus reinforcing, apparently unwittingly, the geopolitical aspirations of the Israeli policy makers. Settlement, security, peace talks with the Palestinians, and the delicate balance of power in the Middle East have inevitably been influenced by the great wave of immigration from FSU. Its political impact is far-reaching: it has an impact on the present peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority over the final settlement.

Granted that immigration challenges may vary in other countries, what can be learned from the Israeli immigration policies? The Israeli example may be considered unique and based on a strong ideological basis, but a few ideas can be extrapolated to countries that contend with significant immigration-related problems.

Indeed, as *Sharkansky (1997, p. 83)* states, "Immigration produces a no-win situation for policy makers." The problems are thorny, the solutions are never perfect, and criticism may always be voiced. The triggers of immigration, the complexity of the problems it creates, the escalation of problems with each new wave of immigration, feelings of social dislocation in the immigrants, and feelings of envy or prejudice in the host society present major challenges in any immigration context. The analysis offered in this study, at root, presents basic "coping policies"[52] and manipulation approaches to meet the problems of immigration integration/absorption. Of particular importance in this context is the ability of policy analysis to use an appropriate method of inquiry that transcends national/geographical boundaries. ■

NOTES

1. Paper commissioned for *"Pioneers 2000: A National Conference on Canadian Immigration"*, Winnipeg, Manitoba, May 4-6th, 2000.

2. While in Israel we refer to "absorbing" immigrants, scholars and officials in other countries describe the process as "assimilation", "incorporation", or "integration". These are progressively weaker terms, "absorption" being the strongest. The multicultural trend in some countries has led many people to consider that a "weaker" perspective is more appropriate, in that it allows immigrants to retain their culture and identity rather than becoming part of a melting pot. (In Israel this relates particularly to Sephardi or Mizrachi (Middle Eastern) Jews who have come to resent the state's efforts to "swallow" their identity and refashion it according to the dominant Ashkenazi model.)

3. For instance, these issues were found on the research agenda in Canada, as presented in *Immigration and the Metropolis: Centers of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Integration*. 1995; they were covered at the 1996 Symposium on Jewish Immigration, JCPA; at the International Metropolis Conference in Milan, 1996; and in Copenhagen, 1997.

4. The latter having become foci of immigration on the same level as North America and Western Europe. See Wong 1998, Thranhardt 1999.

5. Israel does not have a constitution but follows guidelines set by the Declaration of Independence and the related Law of Return, election laws, budgeting laws, and parliamentary laws.

6. Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel, 1948.

7. *Book of Laws*, December 2, 1952.

8. Not including Judea and Samaria (West Bank): this territory covers 5,800 square km, from which Israel is gradually withdrawing as part of the security arrangements reached in the framework of the Oslo Agreement and the peace talks with Jordan and the Palestinian Authority.

9. 80.8% are Jewish Israelis; 835,500 are Muslims (14.6%); 150,000 are Christians (2.9%); 100,000 are Druze (1.7%); in Judea and Samaria there are 920,000 Arabs.

10. In Israeli terms, this means people with academic certification.

11. Throughout the 1990s the number increased to some 13,000.

12. Such as Eastern European and Communist countries.

13. Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, 1996.

14. 35.5% of all immigrants were under the age of 24, vs. 44.5% among the veteran population; 31.3% of them were aged 25-44, vs. 27.5% among veteran population; 19.8% of them were aged 45-64, vs. 17% among the veteran population; and 13.5% were aged over 65, vs. 10.9% of the veteran population.

15. Data provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, 1995.

16. See Table 4 and "Employment as an Absorption Solution" below.

17. Their responsibility was formalized in the 1948 law "Status of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency for the Land of Israel, 5713/1952". Fields of activity were defined between the government of Israel and the WZO. In practice, the Jewish Agency's officials still assist at the ports of entrance of immigrants to Israel; the Agency aids, supports, and finances the journey of Jews to Israel, their housing, education, and retraining, and it handles arrangements in the native country of those who want to emigrate.

18. According to the Jewish Agency's data, in 1987 over 51% of the immigrants continued living at the centers for more than a year.

19. See also Allison 1971; Peters 1984; Rouke 1984.

20. After this period the immigrant is eligible for social security unemployment allowance like Israeli-born citizens.

21. Not including immigrants from Australia, New Zealand, North America, South Africa and Western Europe.

22. Tel Aviv is a business, commercial, and entertainment oriented metropolis (initial population of about 500,000 inhabitants); Haifa is the main port of Israel, an industrial city with high-tech industries, and academic institutions (400,000 inhabitants).
23. Quite often two or three immigrant families shared one apartment.

24. This was true in Israel in the 1950s when the immigrants were North Africans and their immigration profile (less educated) also changed the profile of their neighborhoods. In the 1990s, for instance, this consideration caused certain neighborhoods to resent the settlement of Ethiopian immigrants.

25. In 1995, for instance, under this policy, over 65% of all adults attended Hebrew classes (over 47,500 immigrants; 2,080 classes opened in 74 towns, and some 53 classes functioned for special groups such as physicians and nurses, engineers or scientists, the blind and deaf, and dropout youth).

26. *Immigrant Absorption*, 1996, p.43.

27. Such as Russian literature.

28. Out of some 119,000 students in the educational system 4,500 dropouts aged 14-18 were identified, 2,500 of whom received close assistance.

29. Some 2,340 soldiers were recognized in 1995 as "alone", without a family in the country, thus being eligible for special support and financial assistance.

30. The employment situation in December 1995, according to a survey among all 517,000 immigrants above the age of 15, showed that out of the 268,000 (52%) belonging to the labor force, 60% were men and 40% were women; of these, 90% were employed, i.e., 243,000 -- 91.5% of men and 89% of women, and 25,900 (9.6%) were unemployed -- 8.5% of men and 11% of women. The total unemployment rate was more or less stable during 1990-1994, with a leap of 22% in 1995, but the average did not exceed 10%, which was only slightly higher than the unemployment rate among the veteran population. The Bank of Israel would refute these figures under a different definition of employment. They consider employment or unemployment only when a person works in his/her own profession. As such their findings are different (see Flug and Kasir,1993,1995, n.d.

31. For instance, scientists, specialist engineers, entrepreneurs, physicians, artists, women and the 45-64 age group. (See *Immigrant Absorption – Situation, Challenges and Goals*, 1996.)

32. According to the findings of the Bank of Israel (1995) analyzed by Flug and Katsir (1993, 1995, n.d.) only 35% of the immigrants were employed in their profession or in related professions as compared with 55% for 1979-81.

33. In the case of scientist retraining for teaching, for instance, 60% out of the 174 scientist retrainees found jobs as teachers (see table 4), and 98% continued teaching in the second and third year after the retraining. The main by-product was the benefit to the host educational system, which needed qualified science teachers especially in development towns, low socio-economic areas, and weak science classes. The immigrant scientist teachers were willing to teach in these regions and classes, and they reinforced science teaching in those areas to a significant degree.

34. It should be stressed that about 2,700 still remained unemployed

35. Study on Absorption of Immigrant *Scientists*, 1996.

36. The following is their profile: a majority of 61% were aged up to 44 years, and 27% were aged 45-55. Of these, 97% had obtained their engineering degree in FSU and 93% had worked in their profession prior to immigration. 65% had received their degree in day programs, 22% in evening programs, and 13% in correspondence courses. In terms of specialization 32% were mechanical engineers, 20% civil engineers, 12% electrical engineers, 9% electronics engineers, 4% economists and industrial management engineers, 3% chemical engineers, 3% specialists in electro-mechanics, and 17% in other fields such as mining, nutrition, metallurgy, automation, computers, etc.

37. The Brookdale Institute investigation in 1994 revealed that 95% of the engineers were employed in one job or another. However, only 25% (men 28%, women 20%) ended up working as engineers. 2% worked in other academic professions, 5% as junior engineers and technicians, 33% as skilled workers, 17% as unskilled workers, and 18% in sales and services.

38. Within the Bashan project, seven centers were established around the country for receiving, classifying, and promoting ideas and inventions.

39. See *Technological Incubators in Israel*, 1995.

40. Only doctors who had practiced less than 15 years had to take these exams; the others were exempt.

41. About 2,300 became laboratory workers, over 600 became physiotherapists, occupational therapists, and speech therapists, and over 1,000 went to work in a variety of other professions.

42. According to the Brookdale Institution study, 72% of those who were licensed actually worked as doctors (i.e., less than 45% of the immigrant doctors), but only a minority received tenure in medical institutions.

43. See *Statistics*, 1995.

44. See *Central Bureau of Statistics*, 1996; *Immigrant Absorption*, 1996.

45. Approximately 120,700 of them were aged 45-64, 74,800 were part of the labor force, and 46,000 were scientists, or free professionals: 62% and 60% respectively. (See *Immigrant Absorption*, 1996, for 1991-1995.)

46. *Immigrant Absorption*, 1996, p. 33.

47. Note, however, that at the time of writing 20,000 have still not obtained suitable employment and only 15,000 work in their occupations or close to their occupations.

48. Beenstock and Fisher 1996, figures 10-12.

49. A comprehensive study based on a simulative model.

50. Findings presented in Beenstock and Fisher 1996, p. 19.

51. In Israel, Friedberg (1995); in the United States, Simon 1989, Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994); and in Germany, De New and Zimmerman (1994)

52. Term coined by Sharkansky, 1997.

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